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Abstract
It has been widely accepted that politically induced variance can be generated
when the wage contract is written before an election. In this paper, we show that
in°ation contracts and in°ation targets can eliminate both the in°ation bias and
politically induced variance, if electoral uncertainty is merely due to di®erent pref-
erences. In contrast to the independent central bank that is based on cooperation
between competing parties prior to the election, as suggested by Alesina and Gatti
(1995), the contract and the target can be delegated by the winning party after
the election. Concern for reputation can lead to the convergence of the in°ation
targets assigned by di®erent parties. We also consider the case where uncertainty is
caused not only by di®erent preferences, but also by di®erent desired rates in°ation.
We show that it is quite possible to reduce in°ation but increase the variances of
in°ation and output by adopting the in°ation target regime.
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and electoral uncertainty.
JEL Classi¯cation Number: E52, E58.
¤I would like to thank Mats Persson for his suggestions and discussions. I would also like to thank
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Lars E. O. Svensson, and the participants in the workshop at Stockholm University
for their useful comments. Mail address: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, S-106 91
STOCKHOLM, Sweden. E-mail: xl@ne.su.se
11 Introduction
It has been widely accepted that uncertainty about electoral outcomes has signi¯cant
e®ects on the consequences of monetary policy. One way to model this is to set up a two-
party system, where the two competing parties have di®erent preferences over in°ation
and output, as suggested by Alesina (1987) and Alesina and Gatti (1995). The political
uncertainty is one of the factors that induces variance of in°ation and output. A number
of studies have therefore focused on how to eliminate this politically induced variance
(Alesina and Gatti (1995) and Waller and Walsh (1996)).
An independent conservative central bank based on the idea of Rogo® (1995) is able to
reduce the in°ation bias and the variance of in°ation, but on the other hand, increases the
variance of output. Furthermore, if this central bank is either independent of in°uences
from the parties or is agreed to by the parties prior to the election, politically induced
variance can be eliminated as well. The net consequence of this fully independent con-
servative central bank is a reduction of in°ation and its variance, but not necessarily an
increase of the output variability, as suggested by Alesina and Gatti(1995).
A weakness of this kind of institutional setting is that the in°ation bias can only
be partly reduced. This is consistent with the general institutional weakness of Rogo®
conservative central bank. The in°ation contract (Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini
(1993)) and the in°ation target (Svensson (1997)) have been suggested as new forms of the
instrument independent central bank in order to remove the in°ation bias. One advantage
of in°ation contracts and in°ation targets is that both are able to eliminate the in°ation
bias created by the policy under discretion without generating a higher output variability
when economic distortion is the nominal wage rigidity, as indicated by Svensson (1997).
Despite awareness of the importance of in°ation contracts and in°ation targets, to our
knowledge, there is no theoretical study on how the in°ation contract and the in°ation
target work in an environment with political uncertainty. Furthermore, some empirical
studies show that the variance of in°ation and the variance of output have increased
rather than decreased in countries that have adopted the in°ation target as a means to
reduce in°ation (Iscan and Xu (1997) and Debelle (1997)). It is worth investigating the
possible source of increased variance. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to address these
issues.
2We ¯rst follow Alesina and Gatti (1995) in introducing the political uncertainty that
is due to di®erent preferences in a two-party system. Then we focus on the e®ects of
in°ation contracts and in°ation targets in this system. The main conclusion is that the
in°ation bias generated by discretionary policy and politically induced variance can be
completely removed if the in°ation contract or the in°ation target is set according to the
equilibrium condition. In contrast to the fully independent central bank suggested by
Alesina and Gatti (1995), which is agreed to by both parties and should be appointed
prior to the election, the instrument independent central bank, operating either with the
in°ation contract or with the in°ation target, can be nominated by the winning party
after the election. However, °uctuation still remains in the economy since the two parties
would assign the in°ation target with di®erent values, resulting in di®erent equilibria.
We further study how the repeated game could result in a policy convergence in terms of
a reduction of the di®erence between the targets preferred by the two parties. We also
consider the case where uncertainty is caused not only by the di®erent preferences, but
also by di®erent desired rates of in°ation. We ¯nd that it is quite possible to reduce the
in°ation but increase the variance of in°ation and the variance of output by adopting an
in°ation target regime when the di®erence with regard to the desired rate of in°ation is
large.
2 Electoral Uncertainty due to Di®erent Preferences
2.1 The Model and the Equilibrium under Commitment
Following Alesina and Gatti (1995), here we model how to measure the political (electoral)
uncertainty due only to di®erent preferences. A more general case will be considered in
section 5.
The output is determined by aggregate supply as follows:
y = ¼ ¡ ¼
e + "; (1)
where ¼ is the in°ation, ¼e is the expected in°ation based on the information available in
the previous period, and " is the supply shock which is i.i.d. normal distribution with zero
mean and variance ¾": The natural level of the expected output is normalized at zero.
3There are two competing parties, D and R, in the economy. The only di®erence
between these two parties is their preferences with respect to in°ation and output. Thus


























where ¼¤ and y¤ are positive constants and represent the socially desired rate of in°ation
and output level, respectively. ¼¤ and y¤ are the same across the parties. A positive
y¤ indicates an overambitious output target that would lead to the in°ation bias under
a discretionary policy regime. A positive ¼¤ is not necessarily required by the system.
We make this assumption here simply to ensure that the in°ation target will be non-
negative. The di®erence between the two parties' objective functions is due solely to
di®erent parameters of the preference regarding in°ation and output, ¸: Following Alesina
and Gatti (1995), we suppose that 0 < ¸R < ¸D: Thus party R cares more about in°ation
stabilization relative to output stabilization than party D.
We ¯rst consider the case where the monetary policy is implemented under a commit-
ment policy regime. We also disregard the electoral uncertainty. The timing of events in
each period is as follows. The election is carried out at the beginning of each period. The
winning party then delegates the monetary policy with a policy rule to a central bank.
Next the wage contract is written based on the result of the election and the policy rule.
After the supply shock " is realized, the monetary policy ¼ is chosen by the central bank.




where ¼ indicates that the in°ation is chosen under commitment regime without electoral










1 + ¸D": (6)













1 + ¸R": (9)
Therefore, the mean of in°ation is
E(¼) = ¼
¤; (10)










where the constant P is the probability of party D winning the election; and hence the
constant 1 ¡ P is the probability of party R winning the election. The mean and the
variance of output are










2.2 Electoral Uncertainty and the Discretionary Monetary Pol-
icy Regime
We now consider the case where political uncertainty is introduced into the economy. The
timing of events in each period is changed as follows. The wage contract is written at
the beginning of the period. Next, the election is carried out. The winning party then
delegates the monetary policy to a central bank with its own objective function. After
that the supply shock " is realized. Finally, the monetary policy ¼ is chosen by the central
bank. The length of each period coincides with the length of a wage contract and with a
term of o±ce. Since each period is identical and there is no state variable, the optimal
5choice can be simpli¯ed as a single period choice if we rule out the reputation e®ect that
will be considered in section 4.




D) + (1 ¡ P)E(¼
R): (14)
After the realization of the supply shock ", the central bank appointed by the winning
party chooses the policy ¼ by minimizing the loss function of the incumbent party. This




















1 + ¸R": (16)




¸R(1 + ¸D) + P(¸D ¡ ¸R)
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
y
¤: (17)
The second term in (17) is the in°ation bias, which is a monotonic function of the prob-
ability P: When P = 0; i.e., party R wins the election all the time, the in°ation bias
would reduce to ¸Ry¤: We de¯ne this as the in°ation bias associated solely with party
R: On the other hand, if P = 1; i.e., party D always wins the election, the in°ation
bias would reduce to ¸Dy¤: This is the in°ation bias associated solely with party D: In
general, when 0 < P < 1; the following condition of the in°ation bias is ful¯lled, namely,
¸Ry¤ <
¸R(1+¸D)+P(¸D¡¸R)
1+¸D(1¡P)+¸RP y¤ < ¸Dy¤: This indicates that the in°ation bias lies between
the two in°ation biases associated exclusively with party D and party R: In fact, the
in°ation bias is a mixture of the standard in°ation bias and the politically induced one.
The decomposition is however of minor importance, since we expect the in°ation target
to be able to remove both of them. It can also be shown that the in°ation bias increases
with (¸D ¡ ¸R). In other words, the in°ation bias tends to be larger or its politically
induced component becomes dominant if the di®erence between the two parties increases.
The outputs associated with the di®erent parties' policies then become
y
D =
(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)













1 + ¸R": (19)
As a matter of fact, in each period, the economy may be characterized by one of the
two equilibria, (¼D; yD) and (¼R, yR), i.e., the economy could end up with one of these
equilibria. As described by (15) (16), (18) and (19), no matter which equilibrium is
realized, the realized in°ation and output are a®ected by the probability P: Therefore, the
electoral uncertainty would have an impact on the consequence of the equilibria resulting
from the election of the di®erent parties.
Alesina and Gatti (1995) measure the electoral uncertainty by using the ¯rst and
second moment of the expected in°ation and output. The mean of in°ation coincides
with the in°ation expectation, E(¼) = ¼e; which is given by (17). The variance of
in°ation is then
V ar(¼) =
P(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)2










The variance of in°ation (20) can be decomposed into two parts: one is the politically
induced variance, which increases with (¸D¡¸R), and the other is the standard (expected)
variance of in°ation.
The mean of output can be calculated from (18) and (19):
E(y) = 0: (21)
Therefore, as in the single-party model, there is no systematic gain in output under the
discretionary policy regime. The variance of output is
V ar(y) =
P(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)2
[1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP]2y
¤2 + [
P





Like the variance of in°ation, the ¯rst part of the variance of output in (22) is the politically
induced variance, and the second part is the standard (expected) variance of output:
Thus, by using the ¯rst and second moment of in°ation and output, we can measure
the electoral uncertainty. If a designation of the monetary institution is taken into ac-
count, besides the in°ation bias, the issue of how to remove/reduce the politically induced
variance has to be considered as well.
Alesina and Gatti (1995) have suggested that, in the framework of Rogo® (1985),
if the two parties could agree with each other before the election on the establishment
7of an independent central bank with a conservativeness e ¸; which is smaller than both
preferences ¸D and ¸R, the economy could be improved to an equilibrium:
E(e ¼) = ¼¤ + e ¸y¤; E(e y) = 0;








where the in°ation bias has been reduced and the politically induced parts of both the
variance of in°ation and the variance of output have been removed. It is natural to
ask why the two parties should respect the predetermined agreement when they are in
a position to choose the policy. If there is no blind commitment restricting the policy
decision, such a fully independent central bank has to rely on the cooperation between
the two parties prior to the election. In a one-shot game, such cooperation is incredible.
This is because the winning party can always ¯nd a reason to implement the monetary
policy according to its own loss function. In a repeated game, concern for reputation
can probably lead to full cooperation. However, this requires the probability P ful¯lls a
certain condition and the discount rate ¯ is large enough.
Moreover, this institutional setting is based on the idea of Rogo® conservative central
bank, which is not optimal since it can not remove the in°ation bias completely. In the
following section, we consider the case in which the winning party delegates an objective
function together with either an in°ation contract or an in°ation target to the central
bank after the election. We study how the in°ation contract and the in°ation target
regimes are able to eliminate both the in°ation bias and the politically induced variance.
3 In°ation Contract and In°ation Target Regimes
In contrast to the fully independent central bank based on cooperation between competing
parties before the election, as suggested by Alesina and Gatti (1995), a central bank with
either an in°ation contract or an in°ation target is instrument independent. Either an
in°ation contract or an in°ation target is delegated together with the objective function
by the winning party to the central bank after the election but before the realization of
the shock ". The timing of the events is not changed in other respects. First of all, the
expected in°ation is determined and the wage contract is written accordingly. Next, the
8election is carried out. The winning party then delegates the monetary policy, including an
objective function, either with an in°ation contract f, or an in°ation target ¼B. Finally,
the supply shock " is realized, and the policy ¼ is chosen. We ¯rst consider the in°ation
contract regime.
3.1 In°ation Contracts
Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) have suggested that if the society can
add an extra cost, the in°ation contract, to the central bank's loss function, the in°ation
bias can be removed without causing higher output variability. The in°ation contract
f ¢ (¼ ¡ ¼¤); where f is a constant, is proportional to the deviation of in°ation from the
desired level, suggesting that extra weight is put on the in°ation deviation. Now we shall
investigate how the in°ation contract works in an economy with the two-party system.
We suppose that the in°ation contract is delegated by the winning party after the





























R ¢ (¼ ¡ ¼
¤): (25)




















¤ + ") + f
R = 0;
respectively, where ¼e is given by (14). By taking expectations over the ¯rst order condi-





¸D(1 + ¸R)y¤ ¡ (1 + ¸RP)fD ¡ ¸D(1 ¡ P)fR






¸R(1 + ¸D)y¤ ¡ [1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P)]fR ¡ ¸RPfD
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
: (27)
9Considering the fact that the monetary policy will be implemented according to the










It is quite natural to have di®erent contracts represented by di®erent constants fD and fR
assigned by the di®erent parties. This is because an in°ation bias with di®erent values will
result from di®erent policies. As a matter of fact, the constants fD and fR are equal to
the in°ation biases in the absence of electoral uncertainty. The in°ation contract regime
can assure the general public that the expected in°ation will be at the socially (as well




By substituting (28) (29) and (30) into the ¯rst order conditions, we obtain the in°a-











1 + ¸R": (32)









1 + ¸R": (34)
According to the expected in°ation, the in°ation bias has been completely removed:
E(b ¼) = ¼
e = ¼
¤:
There is no change in the mean of output, which is the same as that in (21).
Under the in°ation contract regime, the variance of in°ation becomes
V ar(b ¼) = [
P(¸D)2
(1 + ¸D)2 +
(1 ¡ P)(¸R)2
(1 + ¸R)2 ]¾
2
": (35)
10By comparing (20) and (35), we reach the conclusion that politically induced variance
has been eliminated from the variance of in°ation. Furthermore, the variance of output
is
V ar(b y) = [
P





where the politically induced variance has also been completely eliminated. Hence, both
the in°ation bias and the politically induced variance can be eliminated by the in°ation
contract regime, no matter which is the incumbent party.
3.2 Optimal In°ation Targets
Next we consider the case of the in°ation target. An in°ation target regime implies that
an explicit in°ation target is assigned to the central bank by the winning party. Since the
two parties would choose di®erent rates of in°ation, it is not an unreasonable assumption
that the two parties would assign the in°ation target with di®erent values, either ¼DB
or ¼RB, if in o±ce: Then, the new objective function for the central bank that would be


























The policy decision under discretion involves the setting of the in°ation ¼ and its target
¼B by taking the expected in°ation ¼e as given in order to minimize LDB or LRB. The



















¤ + ") = 0;
where b ¼ represents an optimal in°ation policy chosen by the winning party under the
in°ation target regime. By taking the expectation over the ¯rst order condition, we
1As a matter of fact, we implicitly suppose that the output targets yB of the two parties are the same
and are always set as the socially desired output y¤.
11obtain the expected optimal in°ation policies:
E(b ¼
D) =
¸D(1 + ¸R)y¤ + ¸D(1 ¡ P)¼RB + (1 + ¸RP)¼DB





¸R(1 + ¸D)y¤ + [1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P)]¼RB + ¸RP¼DB
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
: (40)
Supposing that the optimal in°ation target b ¼DB or b ¼RB is assigned according to the
achievement of the socially desired level ¼¤, E(b ¼D) = ¼¤ and E(b ¼R) = ¼¤: There is no













The in°ation targets assigned by the two parties are di®erent in the second terms of (41)
and (42). The second term in (41) represents the in°ation bias associated solely with
party D; as described in the previous section. Thus the target assigned by party D; b ¼DB;
can be expressed as the socially desired level ¼¤ minus this in°ation bias ¸Dy¤. On the
other hand, the in°ation target assigned by party R; b ¼RB, is the socially desired level
¼¤ minus the in°ation bias associated solely with party R; ¸Ry¤; as indicated in (42).
Furthermore, both in°ation targets, b ¼DB and b ¼RB; are independent of the probability P:
This is because the probability P can only a®ect the monetary policy decision via the
expectation of in°ation ¼e; since the winning party would only care about its own interests
after the election.
The in°ation target regime could have the same consequences as the in°ation contract
regime. Therefore, the in°ation is the same as (31) or (32), and the output is the same
as (33) or (34).
In general, the in°ation target is imperfectly credible, since the target is less than the
expected in°ation ¼¤: The two competing parties will assign di®erent targets to the central
bank and the credibility of the target will therefore naturally di®er. As indicated in (41)
and (42), the in°ation target assigned by party D; b ¼DB; is distant from the expected
in°ation ¼¤; hence it is less credible. On the other hand, the target assigned by party
R; which is more concerned about in°ation (smaller ¸R), b ¼RB, is closer to the expected
12in°ation ¼¤, resulting in higher credibility. Moreover, the less credible in°ation target
b ¼DB is associated with a higher variance of in°ation var(b ¼D); but a smaller variance of
output var(b yD); as indicated in (31) and (32) as well as (33) and (34).
In point of fact, it can easily be shown that the probability-independent equilibria,
(b ¼DB, b ¼D, b yD) and (b ¼RB, b ¼R, b yR), are equivalent to the equilibria resulting from an
economy where the wage contract is written upon the result of the election (¼D, yD) and
(¼R, yR). Hence, the electoral uncertainty has been eliminated by the in°ation target
regime.
4 Convergence of Optimal In°ation Targets
Under the in°ation contract and the in°ation target regimes; the economy in each period
can be described by two equilibrium states, (b ¼DB, b ¼D, b yD) with probability P and (b ¼RB,
b ¼R, b yR) with probability 1 ¡ P. Although the electoral uncertainty has been completely
eliminated, °uctuations can still exist in the economy. For instance, the in°ation target
b ¼B would switch between b ¼DB and b ¼RB: An institutional setting relying on cooperation
between the two parties could help to reduce or even remove this kind of °uctuation.
This institutional design is very similar to the fully independent central bank suggested
by Alesina and Gatti (1995), but it has a di®erent objective.
It would be misleading to measure the °uctuation by using the ¯rst and the second
moments of the expected in°ation and output, (30), (21), (35) and (36). This is because,
even if the °uctuation is removed completely, there might be no change in the ¯rst mo-
ment, and it is di±cult to detect a decreasing trend in the second moment. Therefore,
following, among others, Alesina (1988), we use the convergence of economic variables to
represent the reduction of °uctuation. We are particularly interested in the convergence
of the in°ation target b ¼B, since this in°ation target has been adopted in reality. The
°uctuation of the target has signi¯cance for the credibility of monetary policy. The equi-
librium with a policy convergence is a better one, since both parties could achieve lower
losses.
So far we have regarded the preference parameters ¸D and ¸R as predetermined vari-
ables. In this section, we internalize the determination of the parameters b ¸D and b ¸R; and
investigate whether the cooperation could result in policy convergence.
13If it is a one-shot game, and if there is no blind precommitment, cooperation between
the two parties is not available. (¸D;¸R) is the only Nash equilibrium. In other words,
the preference parameters in the one-shot game equilibrium are always ¸D and ¸R. Hence
the time-consistent equilibrium for the in°ation target is (b ¼DB; b ¼RB); where b ¼DBand b ¼RB
are given by (41) and (42).
When the game can be repeated ad in¯nitum, the total expected loss functions for










































where ¯ is the discount rate and ful¯lls 0 < ¯ < 1. LD(b ¸) in (43) is the indirect one-period





(b ¸)2 + ¸D




where b ¸ is a control variable and CD is a constant with the value of
¸Dy¤2
2 : LR(b ¸) in (44)





(b ¸)2 + ¸R




where b ¸ is a control variable and CR is a constant with the value of
¸Ry¤2
2 : Thus, the
expected total losses for both parties rely on the parameters (b ¸D; b ¸R) chosen by the two
parties simultaneously.
Even without blind precommitments, the economy can still reach better equilibria in
an in¯nite-horizon game. In other words, if the two parties agree on the pair of parameters
(b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤), where b ¸D¤ < ¸D and b ¸R¤ > ¸R; the °uctuation could be moderated, and both









2It can easily be shown that all the other combinations of (b ¸D¤;b ¸R¤), such as b ¸D¤ > ¸D and b ¸R¤ < ¸R;
b ¸D¤ < ¸D and b ¸R¤ < ¸R; and b ¸D¤ > ¸D and b ¸R¤ > ¸R; are not Nash equilibria. In the ¯rst case, both
parties' rationality conditions are simultaneously violated. In the other two cases, one individual party's









If cooperation on the pair of parameters (b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) is sustainable, the subgame-perfect
condition should be ful¯lled. The subgame-perfect condition states that the \temptation"
to deviate from the cooperation should not be greater than the \enforcement". The \temp-
tation" and the \enforcement" are de¯ned according to the punishment mechanism of the
game. The \rules" of game are as follows. Both parties announce their preferred prefer-
ence parameters before the election. If the elected party deviates from its \announced"
parameter, the other party will not cooperate any more. In the coming periods, the equi-
libria would be the same as the one-shot equilibrium. The environment is therefore an
in¯nite-horizon multi-stage game with observed actions that are continuous at in¯nity.
In the case of party D, the one-stage deviation principle can be expressed in terms of


















The left hand side of (49) is the gain from the deviation from the announced parameter b ¸D¤
(temptation). Since LD(b ¸D¤) is always greater than LD(¸D); there is always a motivation
for party D to deviate. The right hand side of (49) represents the present value of total
future costs of the deviation (enforcement). Hence condition (49) states that, if the
cooperation parameter b ¸D¤ is credible for party D; the cost should be larger than the


















It can be shown that there is at least one pair of parameters (b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) that satis¯es
the conditions (47), (48), (49), and (50) for any given discount rate ¯. A detailed proof
can be found in the Appendix. Both b ¸D¤ and b ¸R¤ are functions of the discount rate ¯:
As indicated in the Appendix, following the increase of the discount rate ¯; b ¸D¤ tends
to decline, but b ¸R¤ tends to increase. This indicates that the higher the discount rate
¯; the less the °uctuation. The underlying economic intuition is fairly clear.
¯
1¡¯ is an
increased function of ¯; therefore, an increase of the discount rate ¯ would enhance the
15present value of the \enforcement" (the right hand sides of (49) and (50)), leading to
greater potential for cooperation.
The in°ation targets a®ected by the policy convergence can be expressed as b ¼BD¤ =
¼¤ ¡ b ¸D¤y¤ and b ¼BR¤ = ¼¤ ¡ b ¸R¤y¤, respectively. A smaller parameter b ¸D¤ (compared
with b ¸D) would cause the in°ation target b ¼BD¤ preferred by party D to move close to
the socially preferred rate of in°ation ¼¤, whereas the in°ation target b ¼BR¤ assigned by
party R would move away from the socially preferred rate of in°ation ¼¤: The two targets
would converge. As the discount rate ¯ increases, the targets would converge even more.
If the discount rate ¯ approaches to its upper level, 1; a common point b ¸¤ can be




¤ ¡ b ¸
¤y
¤; (51)
and the economy would be improved to a fully cooperative equilibrium:
E(b ¼¤) = ¼¤ E(b y¤) = 0;








This equilibrium di®ers from the equilibrium reached by the fully independent central
bank (23) in terms of di®erent values of b ¸¤ and e ¸: As discussed by Alesina and Gatti
(1995), e ¸ should be smaller than both parameters ¸D and ¸R: However, the parameter
under the in°ation target regime b ¸¤ is in between ¸D and ¸R: The variance of in°ation
under the in°ation target regime var(b ¼¤) would be larger than that under the Rogo®
fully independent central bank var(e ¼); but the output variance under the in°ation target
regime var(b y¤) would be smaller than that under the Rogo® fully independent central
bank var(e y):
165 Electoral Uncertainty with Di®erent Desired In°a-
tion Rates
Now we consider a more general case where the two parties have di®erent desired rates
in°ation, ¼¤D for party D and ¼¤R for party R.3 Since we have assumed that the party R is
more concerned about in°ation than output, we here assume that the in°ation rate desired
by party R; ¼¤R; is smaller than that by party D; ¼¤D: In order to avoid negative targets,
we further assume that the desired in°ation rates are all positive. By simply repeating
the calculations performed in the previous sections, we can obtain the equilibria under
di®erent policy regimes.
5.1 Equilibrium under Commitment without Electoral Uncer-
tainty











1 + ¸R"; (54)
E(¼) = P¼
¤D + (1 ¡ P)¼
¤R; (55)




















1 + ¸R"; (58)
E(y) = 0; (59)
var(y) = [
P





There is a new term P(1 ¡ P)(¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R)2 in the variance of in°ation. If the di®erence
between the two parties with regard to the desired rate in°ation is large, the variance of
3The restriction that the desired output level y¤ is the same across the parties can be relaxed as well.
However, it can be shown that this only complicates the expressions without a®ecting the results.
17in°ation would be large as well. However, the di®erence would not have any e®ect on the
variance of output.
5.2 Equilibrium under Discretion with Electoral Uncertainty
The equilibrium under discretion with electoral uncertainty becomes
¼
D =
(1 + ¸RP)¼¤D + ¸D(1 ¡ P)¼¤R
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
+
¸D(1 + ¸R)




1 + ¸D"; (61)
¼
R =
¸RP¼¤D + [1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P)]¼¤R
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
+
¸R(1 + ¸D)





















(1 ¡ P)(¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R)
1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
+
(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)








1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP
¡
P(¸D ¡ ¸R)




1 + ¸R"; (66)
E(y) = PE(y
D) + (1 ¡ P)E(y
R) = 0; (67)
V ar(y) =
P(1¡P)[(¼¤D¡¼¤R)+(¸D¡¸R)y¤]2





The politically induced variance,
P(1¡P)[(¼¤D¡¼¤R)+(¸D¡¸R)y¤]2
[1+¸D(1¡P)+¸RP]2 , appears in the variances of
both in°ation and output. One interesting feature is that this term could be smaller than
under commitment without electoral uncertainty, P(1¡P)(¼¤D¡¼¤R)2; if the di®erence in
the desired rate of in°ation is dominant. In other words, under the discretionary regime
with electoral uncertainty, the variance of output could be larger, but the variance of
in°ation could be smaller compared with the variances under the commitment regime.
5.3 Optimal In°ation Targets and In°ation Contracts



















18Therefore the optimal in°ation target depends on the di®erence in the desired rates of
in°ation.


























1 + ¸R"; (74)
E(b ¼)(= b ¼
e) = P¼
¤D + (1 ¡ P)¼
¤R; (75)


















1 + ¸R"; (78)
E(b y) = PE(b y
D) + (1 ¡ P)E(b y
R) = 0; (79)










The in°ation target and the in°ation contract can transfer, but not necessarily improve,
the economy to the equilibrium under commitment without electoral uncertainty except
for an extra term P(1 ¡ P)(¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R)2 in the variance of output. Since the in°ation
targets and the in°ation contracts are equivalent, we will focus in the discussion simply
on an in°ation target regime from now on.
5.4 Disin°ation by Adopting an In°ation Target Regime
By comparing (63) and (75), we ¯nd that in°ation is not necessarily to be reduced by
adopting the an optimal in°ation target regime. However, we are particularly interested
19in the situation where the in°ation target can reduce in°ation. Therefore we consider the
case where
E(b ¼) ¡ E(¼) < 0: (81)








P(1¡P)(¸D¡¸R) > 1: In other words, if the di®erence ¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R is large
enough, adopting an in°ation target regime may not be a suitable strategy for reducing
in°ation. We also notice that @ª
@(¸D¡¸R) = ¡
¸R2+¸D(1+¸D¡¸R)
P(1¡P)(¸D¡¸R)2 < 0: Thus, when the economy
has a smaller di®erence in the preferences (¸D ¡ ¸R); a larger di®erence with regard to
the desired rate of in°ation will be allowed. Since there is a convergence of preferences
when the game is repeated4, condition (82) could cover most situations of the economy in
a framework of repeated game. In other words, the following result will hold for almost
any value of the di®erence ¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R; if we consider the game as a repeated one and the
discount rate ¯ is fairly large.
In any case, if the condition (81) holds, in°ation can be reduced by the in°ation
target. The question is then, what are the e®ects of the in°ation targets adopted as a
new monetary policy regime on the second moments of the in°ation and the output. We
observe that var(¼) = var(y) and var(b ¼) = var(b y); so we only consider the output. The
gain or loss in the output variance can be calculated as follows:
var(b y) ¡ var(y) =
P(1 ¡ P)(¡©1)©2
[1 + ¸D(1 ¡ P) + ¸RP]2; (83)
where ©1 = (¸D ¡¸R)y¤¡(¼¤D ¡¼¤R)[¸D(1¡P)+¸RP]; and ©2 = (¸D ¡¸R)y¤+(¼¤D ¡
¼¤R)[2+¸D(1¡P)+¸RP]: Thus the sign of (var(b y)¡var(y)) depends on the sign of ¡©1:
It can be identi¯ed that ¡©1 is a monotonically increased function of the di®erence in
desired rates of in°ation, namely,
@(¡©1)
@(¼¤D¡¼¤R) > 0: We here consider two extremes, where
¼¤D = ¼¤R; and where (¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R) takes its upper limit ªy¤ from condition (82). It
4The convergence results obtained in the last section could apply in the case where the uncertainty
is also due to the di®erence in the desired rates of in°ation. This is because the choice of optimal
convergence preferences is independent of the desired rates of in°ation. The constant terms in the one-















both the in°ation target regime and the in°ation contract regime:
20can easily be shown that when ¼¤D = ¼¤R; var(b y) < var(y): On the other hand, when
¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R = ªy¤; var(b y) > var(y): This result indicates that when the di®erence in the
desired rates of in°ation is dominant, the variances of in°ation and output might increase
once an in°ation target regime is adopted.
Consequently, we show here a case of reduced in°ation concurrently with increased
variances of in°ation and output. This result is in contrast to that found in an economy
without di®erent desired rates of in°ation. Our theoretical ¯nding here is consistent
with some empirical results. Iscan and Xu (1997) show that the velocity of in°ation in
Canada has increased since Canada adopted an in°ation target regime. Debelle (1997)
demonstrates that the variability of output in countries that have adopted the in°ation
targets has increased, even though in°ation has been reduced.
6 Discussion
It has been suggested that in°ation contracts and in°ation targets are to be able to
eliminate the in°ation bias (Walsh (1995), Persson and Tabellini (1993), and Svensson
(1997)). The advantage of such regimes is that they remove the in°ation bias without
creating a higher variance of output, which can not be avoided under the institution
of Rogo® conservative central bank (Rogo® (1985)). In this paper, we ¯rst study how
in°ation contracts and in°ation targets work when there is electoral uncertainty caused by
the parties' di®erent preferences. We show that in°ation contracts and in°ation targets are
able to eliminate both the in°ation bias and the politically induced parts of the variance
of in°ation and the variance of output. Moreover, in°ation contracts and in°ation targets
do not rely on cooperation between the two parties, which is however required by the
fully independent central bank, as suggested by Alesina and Gatti (1995). Nevertheless,
the in°ation contract and the in°ation target may not remove all the °uctuations in the
economy. Cooperation could, at least, lead the economy to an equilibrium with policy
convergence. If a fully cooperative equilibrium exists, the cooperation parameter ¸¤ would
lie in between the two individual preferences. This is in contrast to the fully independent
central bank, for which the parameter e ¸ is smaller than both individual preferences. We
further extend the simple setting by allowing di®erences in the desired rates of in°ation
to a®ect the economy. We ¯nd that the in°ation target might possibly reduce in°ation
21but create higher variances of in°ation and output.
Debelle (1997) argues that most countries that have adopted an in°ation target have
experienced unsatisfactory monetary targeting or a ¯xed exchange rate. One of the main
reasons for adopting an in°ation target is to enhance the credibility of the monetary
policy. The theoretical ¯nding here indicates that the in°ation target could be su±ciently
powerful to reduce the in°ation without causing higher output variability, if the political
risk is caused by di®erent preferences. However, if the political uncertainty is due to
di®erent desired rates of in°ation, the in°ation target would probably lead to higher
output variability, even though in°ation may still be reduced. In other words, some other
means is needed to enhance the credibility of monetary policy. One way is to limit the
individual parties' in°uence on the central bank's desired rate of in°ation, i.e., to increase
the independence of the central bank. Suppose that the central bank's desired in°ation
is ¼¤CB = (1 ¡ µ)¼¤ + µ¼¤P; where ¼¤P is the desired rate of in°ation delegated by the
winning party with a value of either ¼¤D or ¼¤R: If we normalize that ¼¤ = 0 for simplicity,
the politically induced variance has been reduced to µP(1 ¡ P)(¼¤D ¡ ¼¤R)2 under both
the in°ation contract and the in°ation target regimes.
Alternatively, a central bank with a multi-term central banker can be established. If
it is only possible to delegate monetary policy to the newly appointed central banker, the
political uncertainty can be completely removed in the period(s) of reappointment under
both the in°ation contract regime and the in°ation target regime. In other words, from
the viewpoint of monetary policy decisions, the probability P is either 1 or 0 depending on
the type of reappointed central banker in the period(s) of reappointment. One weakness
of this kind of model is that the optimal term length is always in¯nite.
In order to avoid the in¯nite term length, Waller and Walsh (1996) have introduced
persistent but infrequent shifts in the long-run socially desired rate of in°ation in an
economy associated with a random process of desired rate of in°ation and with an in¯nite
number of sectors. In their model, the central bank is the Rogo® conservative one, and its
preference is partly re°ected by that of the median voter (the government). They show
that a central banker with a ¯nite multi-term would be helpful in reducing the political
uncertainty. Lin (1997) further extends the study to the in°ationcontract and the in°ation
target regimes and ¯nds that all kinds of in°ation contracts and in°ation targets are able
to remove the in°ation bias. However, di®erent regimes give di®erent outcomes. The
22constant in°ation target achieves the best outcome: it completely eliminates political
uncertainty. The constant in°ation contract has no e®ect on the political uncertainty.
However, both regimes are less plausible, since the delegation should be based on the
result of the election (the state of the shock). Rational agents would expect the in°ation
contract and the in°ation target to be contingent on the desired in°ation rate of the
realized median voter. Therefore, the constant contract and the constant target regimes
only reallocate the credibility problem rather than solving it. In any case, the optimal term
lengths of the central bankers under both regimes are always one period. On the other
hand, the state-contingent in°ation contract and the state-contingent in°ation target have
the same economic consequence: the in°ation bias is completely removed, but the e®ects
of the political uncertainty increase, resulting in higher output variability. We conclude
that, under both the state-contingent in°ation contract and the state-contingent in°ation
target regimes, the multi-term central banker would be helpful in reducing the politically
induced variability.
The setting is extremely simple in the present paper and can be further extended.
The probabilities of individual parties winning the election are assumed to be constant in
our study. However, as suggested by Alesina (1988), the probability could depend on the
outcome of the policy. In other words, the economic outcome could increase or decrease
the probability of the incumbent party being reelected. It is interesting to see how the
electoral uncertainty a®ects the economic outcomes under the in°ation contract and the
in°ation target regimes.
Appendix:
A Existence of Convergence Solution (
b ¸R¤;
b ¸D¤)
In this appendix, we prove that there is always a convergence solution ¸R < b ¸R¤ · b ¸D¤ <
¸D in an in¯nitely repeated game. The cooperation on (b ¸R; b ¸D) is determined before the
election in each period.
We ¯rst show that it is possible to have a pair of parameters (b ¸R; b ¸D), where b ¸R > ¸R
and b ¸D < ¸D; which ful¯lls the individual rationality condition, i.e., it would result in
reductions of both losses.








D) + (1 ¡ P)L
D(b ¸
R)];
where LD(b ¸) is the one-period indirect expected loss function associated with party D





(b ¸)2 + ¸D




where b ¸ is a control variable and the constant CD =
¸Dy¤2
2 : LD(b ¸) is an increased function
of b ¸ when b ¸ > ¸D; but a decreased function of b ¸ when b ¸ < ¸D. If b ¸ = ¸D;
@LD(b ¸)
@b ¸ = 0:




(1+¸D)3 > 0: Therefore LD(b ¸) is a U-shape with a
global minimum at the point of ¸D:






P(b ¸D ¡ ¸D)
(1 + b ¸D)3 db ¸
D +
(1 ¡ P)(b ¸R ¡ ¸D)
(1 + b ¸R)3 db ¸
R]: (A1)
We only consider the case of b ¸R > ¸R and b ¸D < ¸D: This is equivalent to db ¸D < 0 and
db ¸R > 0: The net sign of dV D is unclear, since in the square brackets in (A1), the ¯rst
term is positive but the second term is negative.







D) + (1 ¡ P)L
R(b ¸
R)];






(b ¸)2 + ¸R




where b ¸ is a control variable and the constant CR =
¸Ry¤2
2 . LR(b ¸) is a U-shape as well: a
decreased function when b ¸ < ¸R; but an increased function when b ¸ > ¸R: Furthermore,
@LR(b ¸)
@b ¸ = 0 and
@2LR(b ¸)
@b ¸2 = 1
(1+¸R)3 > 0; when b ¸ = ¸R: Therefore when b ¸ = ¸R; LR(b ¸)
reaches the global minimum.






P(b ¸D ¡ ¸R)
(1 + b ¸D)3 db ¸
D +
(1 ¡ P)(b ¸R ¡ ¸R)
(1 + b ¸R)3 db ¸
R]: (A2)
In the square brackets in (A2), the ¯rst term is negative because b ¸D ¡ ¸R > 0; but the
second term is positive because b ¸R¡¸R > 0: The sign of (A2) is therefore unclear as well.
24Now we suppose that the changes in the expected loss functions are in the same path,
i.e. dV D = dV R: So we have the following relationship from (A1) and (A2):
db ¸D
db ¸R = ¡
(1 ¡ P)(1 + b ¸D)3
P(1 + b ¸R)3 : (A3)




(1 ¡ P)(b ¸D ¡ b ¸R)
2(1 ¡ ¯)
db ¸
R < 0: (A4)
Therefore, if the changes of b ¸D and b ¸R ful¯ll condition (A3), the total expected loss
functions for both parties can be reduced as far as b ¸D > b ¸R.
From the relationship (A3), we de¯ne that
± = 'µ; (A5)
where ' =
(1¡P)(1+¸D)3
P(1+¸R)3 > 0: (A5) represents the relative changes of b ¸D and b ¸R in the
neighborhood of (¸D;¸R):
Secondly, we show that there is always a pair of parameters (b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤), which is able
to improve the welfare, and, at the same time, ful¯lls the subgame perfection conditions
























R) = [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ P)]L
D(b ¸









D) + (1 ¡ ¯P)L
R(b ¸
R): (A9)
Therefore the subgame-perfect conditions can be expressed as ¢D(b ¸D; b ¸R) · ¢D(¸D;¸R)
and ¢R(b ¸D; b ¸R) · ¢R(¸D;¸R):
We now show that there is always a pair of parameters (b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) ful¯lling the subgame-
perfect conditions (A6) and (A7) for any discount rate ¯.





[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ P)](b ¸D ¡ ¸D)
(1 + b ¸D)3 db ¸
D +
¯(1 ¡ P)(b ¸R ¡ ¸D)






¯P(b ¸D ¡ ¸R)
(1 + b ¸D)3 db ¸
D +
(1 ¡ ¯P)(b ¸R ¡ ¸R)
(1 + b ¸R)3 db ¸
R: (A11)





¡[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ P)](b ¸D ¡ ¸D) + ¯P(b ¸R ¡ ¸D)






¡¯(1 ¡ P)(b ¸D ¡ ¸R) + (1 ¡ ¯P)(b ¸R ¡ ¸R)
(1 + b ¸R)3 db ¸
R: (A13)
According (A5), we can rewrite (A12) and (A13) by de¯ning that b ¸D = ¸D ¡ ±; and





[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ P)]± ¡ ¯P[(¸D ¡ ¸R) ¡
±
']




¡¯(1 ¡ P)[(¸D ¡ ¸R) ¡ ±] + (1 ¡ ¯P)
±
'
(1 + b ¸R)3 db ¸
R: (A13')
In order to ful¯ll the subgame-perfect conditions, we need both d¢D(±) · 0 and
d¢R(±) · 0: The negative numerators in (A12') and (A13') imply that
± ·
¯P(¸D ¡ ¸R)






¯(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)




Therefore for any discount rate ¯ > 0, a positive constant ±¤ ful¯lling conditions (A14)
and (A15) can be found, and hence a constant µ¤; which satis¯es condition (A5). Further-
more, since b ¸D¤ = ¸D¡±¤ and b ¸R¤ = ¸R+µ¤; d¢D(b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) < 0 and d¢R(b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) · 0.
Hence, ¢D(b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) · ¢D(¸D;¸R) and ¢R(b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) · ¢R(¸D;¸R): Thus, (b ¸D¤; b ¸R¤) is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium and can lead to both parties simultaneously being better
o® (A4).
Finally, we carry out the comparative statics study. The right hand sides of (A14)
and (A15) are the increased functions of the discount rate ¯:
@
¯P(¸D ¡ ¸R)





[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ P) +
¯P
' ]2 > 0
26for the right hand side of (A14), and
@
¯(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)




(1 ¡ P)(¸D ¡ ¸R)
'[¯(1 ¡ P) +
1¡¯P
' ]2 > 0
for the right hand side of (A15). Therefore we should have larger values of ±¤ and µ¤: This
implies that the policy pair b ¸D¤ and b ¸R¤ would move close together, i.e., there is more
chance of a policy convergence, resulting in smaller economic °uctuations.
When ¯ ! 1; we know from (A14) and (A15) that ± !
'
1+'(¸D ¡ ¸R); and therefore
µ ! 1
1+'(¸D ¡ ¸R): Hence ± + µ ! (¸D ¡ ¸R): In other words, we have full convergence.
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